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In quantum cryptography, the level of security attainable by a protocol which im-
plements a particular task N times bears no simple relation to the level of security
attainable by a protocol implementing the task once. Useful partial security, and
even near-perfect security in an appropriate sense, can be obtained for N copies of
a task which itself cannot be securely implemented. We illustrate this with proto-
cols for quantum bit string commitment and quantum random number generation
between mistrustful parties.
1 Introduction
It is now well known that quantum information can guarantee classically
unattainable security in a variety of important cryptographic tasks. We know
too from no-go results that quantum cryptography cannot guarantee perfect
security for every task. We cannot presently characterise precisely the tasks
for which perfectly secure quantum protocols exist, or even the range of cryp-
tographic tasks for which perfectly secure quantum protocols might possibly
exist, because quantum cryptography involves more than devising quantum
protocols for tasks known to be useful in classical cryptography. The prop-
erties of quantum information allow new and cryptographically useful tasks,
which have no classical counterpart. Also, reductions and relations between
classical cryptographic tasks need not necessarily apply to their quantum
equivalents. This means that there is a wider range of tasks to consider,
and that no-go theorems may not necessarily be quite as powerful as classical
reasoning would suggest.
These remarks apply in particular to bit commitment and coin tossing,
important cryptographic protocols whose potential for physically secure im-
plementation has been extensively investigated. It is known that uncondi-
tionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible for non-relativistic
protocols1,2,3,4,5: that is, protocols in which the two parties are restricted
to single pointlike sites, or more generally, in which the signalling constraints
of special relativity are ignored. No unconditionally secure non-relativistic
coin tossing protocol has been found; no proof that no such protocols exist
has yet been published either.
Unconditionally secure bit commitment is conjectured to be possible be-
tween parties controlling appropriately separated pairs of sites, when the im-
possibility of superluminal signalling is taken into account.6,7 Unconditionally
secure coin tossing is simple to implement under these conditions. However,
we restrict attention to non-relativistic protocols in the rest of this paper,
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taking this as understood rather than inserting “non-relativistic” throughout.
Some variants of bit commitment, for which non-relativistic protocols are
not known to be impossible, have previously been studied.8,9 We consider here
a different generalisation, bit string commitment, in which one party commits
many bits to another in a single protocol. Two non-relativistic bit string
commitment protocols, which offer classically unattainable levels of security
against cheating, are described.
2 Bit string commitment
Consider the following classical cryptographic problem. Two mistrustful par-
ties, A and B, need a protocol which will (i) allow A to commit a string
a1a2 . . . an of bits to B, and then, (ii) at any later time of her choice, reveal
the committed bits. The protocol should prevent A from cheating, in the
sense that she should have little or no chance of unveiling bits a′i different
from the ai without B being able to detect the attempted detection. In other
words, A should be genuinely committed after the first stage. The protocol
should also prevent B from being able to completely determine the bit string.
More precisely, it must guarantee that, before revelation, B has little or no
chance of obtaining more than m bits of information about the committed
string, for some fixed integer m < n.
This (m,n) bit string commitment problem is a generalisation of the stan-
dard bit commitment problem, in which n = 1 and m = 0. Clearly, a protocol
for bit commitment would solve this generalised problem, since the protocol
could be repeated n times to commit each of the ai, and B would be able to
obtain no information about the committed string. Conversely, classical rea-
soning implies that a protocol for the generalised problem, for any integers m
and n with m < n, could be used as a protocol for standard bit commitment.
For A and B can use any coding of a single bit a by the n bit string such that
none of the m bits available to B give information about a, and then use the
protocol to commit A to a.
Classically, then, (m,n) bit string commitment is essentially equivalent to
bit commitment. However, there is no obvious equivalence between quantum
(m,n) bit string commitment and quantum bit commitment. The impossibil-
ity of unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment does not necessarily
imply that, with an analogous definition of security, unconditionally secure
quantum bit string commitment is impossible. In fact, the next sections show
it can be achieved.
3 Protocol 1
Define qubit states ψ0 = |0〉 and ψ1 = sin θ|0〉+cos θ|1〉, where sin
2 θ = δ. We
take θ > 0 and r = n−m to be security parameters for the protocol.
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Commitment: To commit a string a1 . . . an of bits to B, A sends
the qubits ψa1 , . . . , ψan , sequentially.
Unveiling: To unveil, A simply declares the values of the string bits,
and hence the qubits sent. Assuming that B has not disturbed the qubits, he
can test the bit values a′i claimed by A at unveiling by measuring the projec-
tion onto ψa′
i
on qubit i, for each i. If he obtains eigenvalue 1 in each case,
he accepts the unveiling as an honest revelation of a genuine commitment.
If he obtains eigenvalue 0 in any case, he concludes (assuming that noise is
negligible) that A has cheated.
Security against A: Whatever strategy A follows, once she trans-
mits the qubits to B, their respective density matrices ρi are fixed. Let
pji = 〈ψj |ρi|ψj〉 be the probability of B accepting a revelation of j for the i-th
bit. We have
p0i + p
1
i ≤ cos
2((π/4)− (θ/2)) + sin((π/4) + (θ/2)) , (1)
which is ≤ 1+θ for small θ. This is the standard definition of security against
A for an individual bit commitment, with security parameter θ. In other
words, A’s scope for cheating on any bit of the string is limited to slightly
increasing the probability of revealing a 0 or 1, by an amount ≤ θ, which can
be made arbitrarily small by choosing the security parameters appropriately.
Security against B: We assume that, prior to the commitment, B
has no information about the bit string and regards every possible value as
equiprobable. From B’s perspective, then, he has to obtain information about
a density matrix of the form
ρ = (1/2n)
∑
a1...an
|ψa1 . . . ψan〉〈ψa1 . . . ψan | . (2)
Holevo’s theorem10 tells us that the accessible information available to B by
any measurement on ρ is bounded by the entropy
S(ρ) = (((1 + sin θ)/2) log2((1 + sin θ)/2)+
((1 − sin θ)/2) log2((1− sin θ)/2))
n . (3)
Now, for any fixed θ > 0, we have S(ρ) < n. For any fixed r, by taking n
sufficiently large, we can ensure n − S(ρ) > r. In other words we can ensure
that, however B proceeds, an average of at least r bits of information about
the string will remain inaccessible to him. By choosing n suitably large, we
can also ensure that the probability of his obtaining more than n− r bits of
information about the string is smaller than ǫ, for any given ǫ > 0.
A more efficient version of this protocol can be devised using qutrit
states11 — an observation I owe to Rob Spekkens.
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4 Protocol 2
Protocol 1 ensures bit-wise security against A, but uses a rather inefficient
bit string coding which allows B to obtain almost all of the bit string before
revelation. For large n, more efficient codings allow the security against B to
be greatly enhanced, though with a weakened notion of security against A.
We again take θ > 0 to be a security parameter and write ǫ = sin θ.
Now, for any θ > 0 and large n, explicit constructions are known for sets
v1, . . . , vf(n) of vectors in H
n such that |〈 vi | vj 〉| < sin θ for all i 6= j, with
the property that f(n) = O(exp(Cn)), where C is a positive constant that
depends on θ.12,13 (The use of these constructions for efficient quantum cod-
ing of classical information has previously been noted by Buhrman et al.14,
who describe efficient quantum fingerprinting schemes which reduce commu-
nication complexity in the simultaneous message passing model.) A string
of O(Cn) bits can thus be encoded by vectors in Hn, such that the overlap
between the code vectors for two distinct strings is always less than sin θ,
suggesting the following bit string commitment protocol.
Commitment: Let N be the number of bits that can be encoded
in Hn by the above construction. To commit a string a1 . . . aN of bits to B,
A sends the state va1...aN , treating the index as a binary number.
Unveiling: To unveil, A simply declares the values of the string bits,
and hence the state sent. Assuming that B has not disturbed the qubits, he
can test A’s claim at unveiling by measuring the projection onto va1...aN . If
he obtains eigenvalue 1, he accepts the unveiling as an honest revelation of
a genuine commitment. If he obtains eigenvalue 0, he concludes that A has
cheated.
Security against A: As before, once A transmits a quantum state
to B, its density matrix ρ is fixed. Consider some set i1, . . . , ir of bit strings
which A might wish to maintain the option of revealing after commitment.
Let Pi be the projection onto vi, let pi = Tr(ρPi) be the probability of A
successfully revealing string i, and write
Q = Pi1 + . . .+ Pir . (4)
It is not too hard to verify that
Tr(ρQ) ≤ 1 + (r − 1)ǫ (5)
In other words,
pi1 + . . .+ pir ≤ 1 + f(ǫ, r) , (6)
where, for any fixed r, f can be made as small as desired by choosing θ suitably
small.
So, given that A is determined to reveal a bit string from some finite
set of size r, her scope for cheating is limited to increasing the probability of
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revealing any given element of the set by a fixed amount. For any fixed r, that
amount can be made arbitrarily small by choosing the security parameters
appropriately. If B’s concern is to prevent cheating of this type, for some
predetermined r, the protocol can guarantee him security.
Security against B: Holevo’s theorem implies that the information
about the N ≈ Cn bit string accessible to B is at most logn bits.
5 Asymptotically secure coin tossing
Consider the following non-relativistic protocol for generating a string of N
random bits between mistrustful parties. We assume that N is large, and take
M also to be large, with logM ≪ N . A preparesM batches of N Bell singlet
states, and sends one particle from each of the MN singlets to B. B chooses
(M − 1) of the batches, and asks A to send the second particle from each of
the (M − 1)N singlets in these batches. B tests that these (M − 1)N pairs
of particles are indeed singlets. If not, he concludes that A is cheating, and
the protocol ends. If so, he accepts that A is honest. A and B then use the
last batch of singlets to generate N random bits, by carrying out correlated
measurements (say of σz) and converting the results to a bit string using a
previously agreed protocol.
Security against A: A can only cheat by preparing non-singlet
states which bias the outcomes towards those she would prefer. Her scope for
cheating is limited by the cut-and-choose step of the protocol, which ensures
that, if any batch has low fidelity to N singlet states, her cheating will almost
surely be detected.
Security against B: B can cheat by carrying out measurements on
every particle from every batch sent to him, deciding which batch gives the
bit string most favourable for his purposes, and choosing the other (M−1) for
the test. However, this will allow him to fix only ≈ logM bits of information
about the N bit string. With suitable M,N this is an insignificant fraction.
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